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KITSCH AGAINST MODERNITyl 
C.E.EMMER 
Preface: Dorfles' Compendium of Kitsch 
The standard English-language text on kitsch is Gillo Oorfles' Kitsch: The World 
of Bad Taste, which came out almost simultaneously in a number of languages 
around 1968-9.2 Dorfles' Kitsch brings together a number of essays on various 
subfields in the topic ofkitsch,3 interspersed with Dorfles' introductions and com­
mentaries. In addition, the book is literally and haphazardly supplied with hun­
dreds of photographs of various "kitsch" items.4 Overall, the presentation makes 
the book somewhat confusing; even though the text speaks of "the shrewd [indict­
ment] of a situation which is so dangerous for our society," the numerous photo­
graphs, which are accompanied by (presumably) Oorfles' editorializing, and which 
frequently threaten to crowd the text right off the page (sometimes leaving only 
fivc lines per page of the essay for which they are ostensibly illustrations), give the 
impression more of celebration than condemnation. Curtis F. Brown's Star-Spangled 
Kitsch, which refers to Oorfles' book as "informative, at times abstruse,"5 shares 
this seemingly self-contradictory trait, but to a much higher degree: the text loses 
even more ground to the illustrations, and the tone, though occasionally moralizing 
and always derogatory, actually inclines more towards laughter and a sort of 'aren't 
we Americans silly?' attitude.6 
I was drawn to the subject of kitsch to a large extent for this very reason, 
i.e., the peculiar ambivalence which almost always haunts its discussion. When I 
first came across Dorfles' book, I thought it was hilarious. My first reaction to it 
was enjoyment; I joined the editor in his amazement at the stupidity, shallowness, 
and basic tackiness of the great majority of objects with which we surround our­
selves. Each page presented yet another functional mismatch, another invitation to 
a rugged suspension of disbelief. And yet, as I spent more time with the book, I 
began to question the disdain which my laughter presupposed. On one level, I 
wondered to what degree my laughter and dismissal could be part of a maneuver to 
achieve a(n unjustified) feeling of superiority. On an even deeper level, I began to 
come across moments when the object which was presented for my disapproval 
had once been - or still was - something I honestly enjoyed or respected. At 
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these points, my reflections upon the naive consumer were no longer theoretical, 
not even empirical observations, but extremely intimate. 
Clement Greenberg's essay, "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" appears in the 
Dorfles collection abridged. When I read the essay in full, I came across this com­
ment: 
Kitsch is deceptive. It has many different levels, and some of them are 
high enough to be dangerous to the naive seeker of true light. A maga­
zine like The New Yorker, which is fundamentally high-class kitsch for 
the luxury trade, converts and waters down a great deal of avant-garde 
material for its own uses.7 
Now I had always considered the idea of being published in The New 
Yorker as a sign of quality, as an honor, a true mark of distinction, and had noted 
how many of (what I considered to be) the best pieces of fiction (such as Mark 
Helprin and Denis Johnson) had first seen print in its pages. I was familiar with the 
'watered-down avant-garde' phenomenon of which Greenberg spoke, but had usu­
ally noticed this sort of dishonesty or structural ambivalence when I had come 
across it. 8 Had I now come across - in Greenberg's words - one of "these acci­
dental and isolated instances [which] have fooled people who should have known 
better"? I could excuse myself by arguing that perhaps The New Yorker of the late 
30's was a different creature than in later decades, but that might well only be a 
cheap shot at dodging a criticism which happened to include me.9 
Furthermore, and at an even shorter distance, there were the undeniable 
examples of the kitsch attitude which I discovered in my own diaries (from my late 
teens), which I had just recently unearthed from my attic. All the signs were there: 
paeans to the glories of the later Pre-Raphaelites, sketches from Edward Bwne­
Jones, idealizing prose poems on nature and love, half-hidden lust, and misty aspi­
rations, all written in calligraphy and abundant flourishes, peppered with occa­
sional runes. I can remember during that time the indignation I felt upon reading a 
comment that Bwne-Jones' work was "suffocated in syrup." Reading over these 
diaries again, after having for the most part forgotten what they contained, I am 
reminded of Marx's self-criticism of his state of mind upon arriving in Berlin: 
lyrical poetry was bound to be my first subject ... owing to my attitude 
and whole previous development it was purely idealistic. My heaven. 
my art, became a world beyond. as remote as my love {Jenny von 
Westphalen]. Everything real became hazy and what is hazy has no 
definite outlines. All the poems of the first three volumes I sent to Jenny 
are marked by attacks on our times, diffuse and inchoate expressions of 
feeling, nothing natural, everything built out of moonshine, complete 
opposition between what is and what ought to be, rhetorical reflections 
instead of poetic thoughts. but perhaps also a certain warmth of feeling 
and striving for poetic fire. 10 
(We may note that Marx's self-criticism culminated in his bwning his attempts at 
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"poetic fire.") 
Now, I have heard the charge brought against discussions of kitsch that 
they characteristically begin from hypothetical consumers going through hypothetical 
emotions based on hypothetical motives - in other words, that the standard 
'kitschographer' does not speak from knowledge, but has simply made up the en­
tire phenomenon under discussion. Vis-Ii-vis the theory of artistic choice as status­
drive, for example, we fmd this: 
Not one empirical study ... finds respondents offering status as the main 
reason for their [artistic] choice. [It may be objected that people would 
not want to admit this.] Perhaps. But how do we know? Unsystematic 
data? Our own longing? For so empirically minded a discipline as soci­
ology, this weak support for a central thesis is unsatisfactory, and per­
haps even scandalous. II 
At least in the case of these diaries, the complaint of speculation or armchair psy­
chologizing cannot be lodged, for I know this sappy sentimentalist personally; in­
deed, these were events and emotions that I myself lived and believed! 
The ambivalence I have sensed in relation to the kitsch concept serves as 
a sort of preliminary intuition. The upshot of this inkling is that the kitsch concept 
as I have come across it will, upon closer examination, probably exhibit a combi­
nation of useful and useless insights. Therefore, the goal of this essay will be to 
perfonn an examination of the kitsch concept, in order to discover what it is, if it 
has any legitimate use, and, if it does, to discover what the limits of that legitimate 
use are. 
Introduction: Defining Kitsch 
When one discusses kitsch, what is one discussing? Though for anyone presum­
ably reading this, the tenn "kitsch" will automatically bring to mind a number of 
related tenns (e.g., "schlock," "schmaltz," "bric-a-brac," "tchotchkes," etc.), let us 
begin at the beginning, with a short list of "typical" or "traditional" kitsch items. 12 
In his essay, "Notes on Traditional Kitsch,"I) Aleksa Celebonovic ticks off a healthy 
number of examples: traditionally, kitsch is understood to refer to such things as 
"souvenirs, animals, sickly statuettes, non-functional tumblers and dinner services 
... [p]lastic knick knacks, plaster Buddhas, bare-breasted enameled negresses, cel­
luloid trays with lace engravings ... [and] huge cushions of fake velvet." Dorfles' 
own list gives a feel for the wider application he wants to give the word: "the 
brazen styling of the bodywork of cars, the vulgarity of tourism, the inhuman hor­
ror of summer beaches and winter skiing resbrts, and, similarly, the newly-weds' 
bedroom furniture, American kitchens, hordes of garden gnomes and rabbits and 
Disneyland characters, the Swiss-miniature phenomenon and so on. "14 Though some­
thing ineffable seems to float between all these things, what really strikes one is the 
incredible variety and chaotic hodgepodge, as if the collation of kitsch results itself 
in something not unlike the mess of trinkets on a bedroom shelf destined for a 
kitsch catalog. 
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Hennann Broch, in the fIrst lines of "Notes on the Problem of Kitsch," 
warns us not to "expect any rigid and neat defInitions. Philosophizing is always a 
game of prestige played with the clouds, and aesthetic philosophy follows this rule 
just as much"; 15 elsewhere, he observes that most concepts in the human sciences 
evaporate "upon closer inspection into something vague and therefore highly un­
scientific. "16 Our topic - kitsch - is subject to these observations in an especially 
marked fashion. 
This is due, I suspect, to the frequent use of the tenn "kitsch" to mean 
simply anything done in "bad taste," which can be discovered in as wide a fIeld as 
the person applying the word wishes to leave remaining as the focal circle of "good 
taste" is increasingly narrowed. Indeed, the critical lens can be focused to such a 
fme point that the miniature projection of the sun which results leaves behind only 
a smoking scar of burnt flesh. On the other hand, like any other word, the word 
"kitsch" can be used with a higher or lesser degree of precision and care, and, to the 
degree that it is used merely as a sign of denigration and is practically interchange­
able with any number of other pejoratives, its usefulness - or revelatory power -
is greatly (if not completely) diminished. We should, however, not make these 
observations sloppily; for in discussing the scope of "kitsch," we can refer either to 
the degree of precision which a user gives to its meaning, or we can refer to the 
number of things which will be allowed to fall under this teOll, whether in its more 
precise or less precise use. Even if "kitsch" is defmed in a very restricted way, 
cases can be found in which the restricted meaning is allowed a wide fIeld of appli­
cation and a great number of examples. 
Surveying the literature, we fInd "kitsch" appearing rather regularly in 
association with a sort of family of related tenns. Certain adjectives, for example, 
appear regularly in its company (notwithstanding that many of these words are 
English translations of words from non-English books and essays). This family of 
related tenns has a number of more or less distinct subdivisions - I have lettered 
* them (a) through (h), and supplied each subdivision with representative tenns. Taken 
at once, we seem to already have a rather unmanageable collection, 17 but, we might 
reassure ourselves, kitsch can be taken to appear in a variety of milieus. 
By creating these subdivisions, we have generated a rough-and-ready sur­
vey of the topics broached in most scholarly discussions of kitsch. Even though our 
list has given us a start, this sorting of qualities into categories still comes off rather 
clumsily. It might be noted that, given the generally negative import of these char­
acteristics, each characteristic actually fonns just half of an opposition, the other 
half of which is easily generated by supplying the reverse, say, with the word "not." 
Tadeusz Pawlowski has generated a list of the key oppositions necessary for a 
discussion of kitsch, which he refers to as an expandable "comprehensive typol­
ogy" necessary for "cop[ing] with existing diversity," though his oppositions are of 
opposing approaches to the question of kitsch.IB He concludes that, "[ a]t best kitsch 
phenomena fonn a family of subsets, cormected only by partial similarities. "19 Pierre 
Bourdieu observes (though in a radically different context) that, "when confronted 
by a confusing multiplicity in cultural phenomena, the fIrst natural reaction for the 
professional intellectual, who is inevitably imbued with structuralist habits, is to 
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* The list in question can be found on page 80, following note 91. 
draw up a 'table' of the pertinent oppositions, for each author as well for the set of 
related authors. In fact the effect of such a fonnal construction would be to destroy 
the specific logic of these ideological clusters. The specific feature is their indeter­
minate nature, which makes them akin to the fundamental polarities that structure 
mythical systems . ... Thus, any thinker may, in a particular situation or context, de­
velop applications which seem contrary to rigorous logic, yet may be justified in 
terms of the logic which matches the pairs of practical contradictions that found the 
partial systematizations." 20 Presumably the situation is a little bit different here, for 
unlike Pawlowski, who is attempting to map the whole tradition of' kitschography' 
into a system, what we are attempting to do is to rescue the valid conceptualizations 
(should any exist). On the other hand, Bourdieu seems to suggest that any system­
atization based on oppositions is likely to be less rigorous than it takes itself to be, 
and there is a chance that any answers we come up with may exhibit this tendency. 
The Deduction of Kitsch 
Pawlowski raises the question of "corroboration," or the justification for declaring 
something to be kitsch (he seems to concentrate mostly on the intention of the 
producer). He observes that most of the statements made about the intention of the 
author or producer of that which is alleged to be kitsch rarely fmds substantiation.21 
What needs to be clear is that there are two levels to this "corroboration." There is 
the level at which Pawlowski discusses it, namely, (a) determining whether or not 
the object to be designated as kitsch actually conforms to the definition of kitsch 
then being used (in his discussion he refers to "false naiviete," pretentiousness, and 
imitativeness).22 At another level, one must (b) determine whether or not the char­
acteristics being scrutinized deserve the kind of attention they receive, especially 
given that discussions of kitsch usually hinge upon putting a goodlbad opposition 
into play. 
This observation brings us to a particularly entrenched set of goodlbad 
distinctions which often work their way into evaluations - whether or not they are 
consciously intended to have such an effect. The analytic triad of class, gender, and 
race, though a conventional one, is so for a good reason: these are three aspects 
which inform almost all aspects of life, even if only as strong influences or param­
eters of meaning, and not completely determinant. I will only have the space to 
sketch out the beginning of an analysis into the effects of these topics upon the 
articulation of the kitsch concept as it appears in the standard literature. But this 
sketch should be enough to alert us to their implications (difficult though they may 
be to lay out systematically) for the kitsch concept in terms of this second level of 
"corroboration. " 
Concerning class, it seems that a number of 'kitschographers' wished to 
take this variable into account, but did so on the assumption that status (or status­
seeking) was the primary category for investigating class and kitsch. 23 For example, 
an idea frequently broached in discussions of kitsch is that members of the "lower" 
classes only purchase kitsch because it is an imitation of "upper" class art forms, 
and they would like to have the appearance of belonging to that class, even though 
they do not possess the skills (education or socialization) necessary to recognize 
VOL. 13, No.1 57 
"real" art, let alone understand it. Therefore, goes the argument, they are depen­
dent upon the advice of experts (who do understand these "upper" class art fonns) 
or are dependent upon advertisers who simulate such expertise and advice. 24 
This contention, however, if true occasionally (it is always a possibility), 
is not born out by the research done by David Halle, who found out e.g. that people 
who own and display a reproduction of Leonardo's Last Supper frequently do not 
know (and apparently could not care less) who the painter of the original was. So 
the motive for purchasing these reproductions was not to show it off as a Leonardo! 
In another instance, Halle describes asking a woman about the painter of Vincent 
van Gogh's Sunflowers (a reproduction of which was displayed in her home): "she 
examined the signature and said it was by someone named 'Vincent'!"25 Nonethe­
less, class distinctions are not unimportant; the point is merely that in pointing to an 
object as kitsch because it has "lower" class consumers may reveal more about the 
untested - perhaps class-based! - assumptions of the pointer than the meanings 
of class differences. 
The category of gender also makes its mark on the kitsch concept of the 
'kitschographers.' This is most obvious in the denigration saved for the experienc­
ing of emotions or levels of emotions associated with women (even if the perhaps 
the writer bears no particular animus against women). All of the "overly sentimen­
tal," "weepy" emotions usually associated with and criticized in kitsch are emo­
tions or emotional responses nonnally associated with women. We find a gentler 
example us such an attitude in a recent movie review: "What are two intelligent 
people ... doing in this retro weepie plot? Love Affair is kitsch derived from old 
'woman's film' fonnulas"; at its strongest, we have the warning from Lenin: "I 
can't listen to music often, it affects my nerves, it makes me want to say sweet 
nothings and pat the heads of people who, living in a filthy hell, can create such 
beauty. But we mustn't pat anyone on the head or we'll get our hand bitten off."26 
Immanuel Kant's Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the 
Sublime -which, for a book which focuses on beauty, certainly has some repUlsive 
observations on gender and race!-though it does not deal specifically with kitsch, 
bears out the above remarks on kitsch and gender, and touches on the long history 
of such attitudes. For if one examines the dichotomies set up therein between the 
beautiful and sublime (which Kant associates with women and men, respectively 
[see esp. section III]), one will fmd an almost one-for-one correspondence with the 
emotions most 'kitschographers' connect to kitsch (the beautiful, 'womanly' emo­
tions) as against 'real' art (the sublime, 'manly' emotions).27 Just as with the class 
category, things are not as simple as they may at first appear, and due caution must 
be Used.28 
The main caution is to be wary of searching out phenomena which are 
representations from faulty oppositions or baseless conceptions, or if one does 
search them out, to investigate them rather as indicators than sources. It may not be 
the phenomena under observation which need to be critiqued, but the schemas 
from which they get their present meaning. And yet so far we have only sketched 
out a negative description of the kitsch concept, i.e., what it should not be. It is time 
to push forward into an attempt to describe that conception which deserves not 
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attack but support. Nonetheless, if such a conception is found, it will still have to 
pass the test of the first level of "corroboration"-whether or not the kitsch objects 
or kitsch experiences exhibit the characteristics they are claimed to have. 
Suffice to say that to gain more cohesion one would have to move beyond 
the qualities of kitsch objects (such as we have arranged in our table of kitsch 
qualities, see end) and on to what kitsch is alleged to "do," or what the kitsch 
"attitude" reveals or promotes, much of which cannot be easily captured in single 
adjectives or even tables of such adjectives. The basic thrust of Dorfles' anthology 
is to press for the progression from an understanding based on classifying objects, 
through structures which these objects exhibit, the techniques used to produce them, 
and finally to the psychic phenomena which support them, culminating in the con­
cept of the "kitsch-mensch," or the obsessive consumer of kitsch. 
We shall also use this more "subjective" approach, but only to a degree. 
For even though it turns out that a SUbjective analysis will be central to the kitsch 
concept here advanced, we will not abandon the imperative to find empirical sup­
port for this conception either. Collecting and cataloging kitsch objects, however, 
would be much too de-contextualized for our use. In Giesz' words, the idea would 
be "to start appreciating the superiority of an analytical, apparently over-generous 
outlook which speaks for example of kitsch-man and does not collect (' scientifi­
cally') kitsch postcards, cushions and souvenirs, nor worry about cataloging them."29 
After the Groundclearing: Preliminary Distinctions 
We have, then, eliminated a number of standard elements in the use of the kitsch 
concept, or at least marked them as questionable and admissible only when handled 
with an extremely light touch. In general, the 'ethical' or 'psychological' uses of 
the kitsch concept, in their tendency to degenerate into heavy-handed derogatory 
evaluations, reveal less about the psychology of their ostensible focus than the 
psychological state of their proponents (angry, silencing, polemical, polarizing, 
self-opaque).30 The perspective which holds more promise for actually revealing 
something about its object is a 'historical' (or even an 'art historical') conception 
of kitsch. 
The last assertion may require some clarification. For though my claim is 
that this 'historical' view of kitsch is better than the 'ethico-psychological' per­
spective, the psychological perspective has as its very point the idea that "kitsch­
mensch" tries to escape the surrounding historical conditions. A better formulation 
may be that the downfall of the 'ethico-psychological' perspective is its inclination 
to conceive of this escape as the symptom of a necessarily morally weak or emo­
tionally diseased psyche. Broch, for example, states that "if you ask yourselves to 
what extent you are affected by this avalanche of kitsch, you will tind - at least I 
fmd it as far as I am personally concerned - that a liking for kitsch is not all that 
rare. 'llie conclusion that we are heading towards an ever-increasing universal neu­
rosis does not seem unfounded.")l The difference would have to be that between 
(a) a psychological conception which is a psychological analysis (a diagnosis or 
evaluation) and (b) a psychological approach which by any other name would be a 
subjective (i.e., 'mental' or 'intentional') investigation. The adequate perspective 
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will then inspect the 'subjective' (or 'psychological') aspects of coping with rel­
evant historical phenomena. 
Kibch as Modem 
If thc kitsch concept includes modernity (as it does e.g. for Broch and Calinescu), 32 
then the first step in its justification is accomplished: we rescue kitsch - or at least 
one conception of kitsch-from the first obstacle, namely, that it is a concept so 
vague and pliable that it can be applied anywhere at will. To connect kitsch to 
modernity attaches it to a specific historical period with particular characteristics. 
It thereby has at least a referent with certain boundaries, a referent with a certain 
structure (dialectical though it may be). 
T his move also answers the question of the range of kitsch in place and 
time. Kitsch, in this conception, would not embody a 'type' which could descend 
anywhere upon a universal field (granted that, even in its widest conceptions, it still 
confines itself to the advent of humanity), We need not deliberate endlessly over 
whether the erotic decoration of Etruscan tombs and situlas or the gaudy spectacles 
of the Caesars also constituted kitsch (though the question would still be open 
should they be imitated today). We can also dispense with the question of kitsch in 
cultures umeached by modernity (should any existV3 
The Oorfles anthology for the most part presents the kitsch concept as 
historically restricted ("not ... outside our own age; or at least no earlier than the 
Baroque period"),J4 for two reasons: (8) the historical function of art was categori­
cally different in pre-modem societies (on the one hand, it had "religious, ethical or 
political" functions which were conceived of within an "absolute" realm,35 and 
which took place in a sacred or ritual context;36 on the other hand, it had not yet 
been absorbed into a mass-production process,37 nor could it take part in the ro­
mantic conception of the world);]1 and (b) our knowledge of antiquity is extremely 
limited (at the crudest level, only a few documents from that time have survived, 
and almost exclusively from the aristocracy);39 furthermore, the recognition of the 
kitsch 'tone' requires a lived familiarity with cultural materials and meaning, so 
that recognizing kitsch in unfamiliar materials is basically "impossible. ' .. 0 
Granted, both reasons given by Oorfles rule out finding kitsch amongst 
the ancient Romans, but how these exclusions play out in each case is not the same. 
Consideration of the 'historical function' takes place on an 'a priori' (or 'theoreti­
cal') level, whereas the 'limits of knowledge' approach offers an 'a posteriori' 
('practical,' 'technical,' or 'contingent') criterion. This 'practical' criterion, due to 
the distance which critics of kitsch usually seem to have from the subculture they 
critique, while presumably bracketing, say, ancient or medieval culture or even 
'primitive' cultures in our own time, is also liable to bracket subcultures within our 
own, the very groups so often taken to be in the dangerous thrall of kitsch!41 
Gies?' discussion of the kitsch attitude endemic to tourism, in particular 
packaged tour-groups,42 presents the two alternatives of universally possible ver­
sus strictly historically confined kitsch as "the two extreme positions.''') From the 
basic r(lct that we (humans) live as it were in the tension between the transcendental 
and the empirical (ot even between the transcendent and the worldly), he argues for 
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navigating between the "extreme" poles, namely, recognizing that kitsch involves 
elements of the psyche (e.g. tension, release, boredom, curiosity, projection, etc.) 
which are indeed universal,44 but which are nonetheless brought to bear upon spe­
cific historical processes and conditions (any "mass age"), and which only thereby 
occur as kitsch.4s 'This nuance is what allows Giesz to discuss the holy water brought 
back by the crusaders and "[cans] of 'Berlin Air'" brought from a modern-day 
vacation as "kindred phenomena ... antbropological[ly).'>46 'Inc position we take, 
then, would be characterized as "extreme" by Giesz; for we are positing kitsch as 
confined to, and indeed structurally dependent upon, the modem age. 
Modernity and Its Inflections 
If we are going to discuss kitsch as a co-phenomenon with modernity, what are we 
referring to as 'modem'? Most certainly not a bald assertion of date which would 
impermeably separate to realms, one before, one after. Two conceptions in particu­
lar seem the most promising, and will lie at the base of our discussion: what we 
could call (a) the 'inunanent' conception and (b) the "linear" conception. 
The immanent conception of modernity concentrates on the increasing 
compartmentalization, specialization, and autonomy of ditlerent realms of life and 
thought following the loss of control over the Western world on the part of the 
"Catholic" Church (reflected in the world of ideas by the disintegration of the 
wholistic world view).47 Through this process, each realm seeks to (or has no choice 
but to) develop its own logic without the prescriptions of other realms. Philosophy, 
for example, once the "queen of sciences" (taken up and internalized by the Catho­
lic church), sees the various divisions within it (once understood as integral ele­
ments) separate like buds of yeast into their own domains of natural science, psy­
chology, political science, etc.; natural science itself splits otf into physics, chemis­
try, biology, etc.; and physics divides from Newtonian mechanics into macro- and 
microphysics. 
In general, each of these new divisions in the theoretical realm is carried 
by divisions in their human departments. All realms split apart and - each accord­
ing to its own "freedom" - develop their own languages and methodologies. Each 
seeks to fmd its direction from within, so that e.g. in the fine arts an increasing 
formalism and purity takes hold of the influential movements and seed ideas. Tra­
ditional content evaporates as painting looks to its materials and becomes a logic 
of color arrangements, poetry concentrates on its word, sculpture becomes the com­
position of three-dimensional form, and music, seen as the most pure and contentless 
art form, becomes the mode1.48 
In the German Ideology, Marx describes the seemingly contradictory logic 
of this increasing division. In the broadest terms it is the movement from history to 
world history. On the one hand, each geographical region becomes less and less 
isolated, more connected to the others, and more strongly affected by develop­
ments elsewhere, so that an invention in England causes famine in India.49 On the 
other hand, accompanying this increased interdependence is a multiplication of the 
divisions of labor, initially between different regions which had all been more or 
less self-sufficient, and eventually down to the individual worker, who once com-
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manded an entire craft but who now, with the rise of manufacture and big industry, 
perfonns one task alone.50 In a pre-industrial, 'merely' historical, and yet holisti­
cally conceived world, the wholistic world view allowed theologians to discuss the 
angels on the head of a pin; the fragmented yet interdependent world-historical 
world only allows the worker to make pin heads. 
The linear conception of modernity focuses instead upon the logical con­
clusions of the ascendancy of linear, historical time over cyclical, mythological 
time - conclusions which have only fully emerged in the last few centuries. 
Calinescu's elucidation of the linear conception describes the ascendancy oflinear 
timc and the subsequent development of what he calls "the two modernities," namely 
"bourgeois" modernity and "aesthetic" modernity. 51 
[,inear time was the revolutionary seed inside Christianity's world view. 
Originally, time had been conceived in a mythical, generally cyclical manner, in­
volving cycles of reincamation (e.g. Plato), endlessly rotating spheres (cf. Aristotle) 
- two philosophical elaborations of the mythological view - or repeating con­
flicts and rebirths (e.g. Indian mythology). These myths, while indeed including 
grand narratives of creation from chaos and final battles of the gods (e.g. Greek or 
Norse mythology), in general incorporated'humanity into repeating universal cycles 
which came long before and would follow long after. Calinescu underscores the 
fact that, while modernity is usually associated with the falling away of the church 
as the leading force in society, the forward-moving, historical, non-repeatable time 
which is modernity'S fundamental presupposition does not contradict, but instead 
finds its most important center of propagation in, the Christian world view. 52 
lbe Old Testament world view did posit the world as historical (indeed 
the universe itself was only seven days older than humanity's organization of it!), 
but Christianity, with the stark, radical break and unrepeatability of Christ's ap­
pearance at its center, coupled with its messianic spirit, heightened this historicity 
and proclaimed this "good word." Granted, the revolutionary import of the Chris­
tian conception of time was dampened during the Middle Ages (during which time 
it was covered over with the earlier mythological, organie-continuous additions), 
but eventually (with inter alia the spread of the Bible itself) it took root. 53 In the 
secularism of modernity we see that Christ the table-turner proclaimed a world 
view of discontinuity and radical change which in the end outstripped its very mes­
senger.14 
Calinescu describes "two modernities." The first he calls "bourgeois" mo­
dernity. Bourgeois modernity developed as linear time eventually came free from 
Medieval accretions and Christianity itself This first modernity is, he says, "a stage 
in the history of Western civilization - a product of scientific and technological 
progress, of the industrial revolution, of the sweeping economic and social changes 
[of! capitalism."11 Emblematic of bourgeois modernity arc "[the middle-class val­
ues of] the doctrine of progress, [optimism in] science and technology, the concern 
with time [as measurable and buyable), the cult of reason, and the ideal of [abstract 
humanist autonomy, coupled with a worship of practicality and) suecess."16 
Over against this stands "aesthetic" modernity (often called "modernism")' 
This modernity is an artistic or "acsthctic" concept. Over against bourgeois moder-
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nity, which exhibits linear time as positive progress or improvement, aesthetic mo­
dernity expresses the constant change of linear time more radically, as disgust with 
the recent past, and defines itself principally in opposition to bourgeois modernity. 
lbe heterogeneous positive programs of the modernists (such that they existed at 
all) only make sense when seen through their centrally negative stands. �1 "When 
modernity comes to oppose concepts without which it would have been inconceiv­
able [e.g., reason, progress, science] it is simply pursuing its deepest vocation, its 
constitutive sense of creation through rupture and crisis. "�8 
As regards the relation between these two ways of conceiving modernity 
(i.e., the immanent conception and the linear conception), it can be seen that the 
inunanent conception forms a component of the world, seen as bourgeois moder­
nity - the increasing purity of science, teclmology, and time, the incrcasing spe­
cialization in manufacture, packaging, education, entertainment, etc. There seems 
to be a conflict between the immanent conception (insofar as it approachcs a mate­
rial description, especially in Marx) and the linear conception (insofar as it takes 
what could be called a history of ideas approach), but it is easy to see that the two 
complement each other: insofar as, within the increasing world situation of special-
. ization (material inunanence), each successive group which takes over control breaks 
with the past, the concept of change and irreversibility (linear time) taken up by 
these groups lends authority and meaning to their actions; on the other hand, inso­
far as each group accelerates change towards compartmentalization within the world, 
the concept of linearity only receives more support and reality, and the wholistic 
mythical conceptions of the world make less and less sense. 59 
Kitsch against Modernity 
So far, the picture we have drawn depicts kitsch as coeval with modernity. What 
must be shown, of course, is that kitsch did not simply happen to occur alter the 
advent of modernity, but that modernity had something to do with this occurrence. 
What then does kitsch have to do with modernity? Taking up what we chose as the 
best method for approaching the question of kitsch, namely, that perspective which 
inspects the 'subjective' aspects of engaging historical phenomena, we can formu­
late a preliminary defmition: kitsch is the modem coping-mechanism for moder­
nity. Kitsch is not as such evil, but rather an attempt to deal with the vicissitudes of 
modem life, to make it, in its implacability, inhabitable.60 
As has been made clear by the preceding exposition, modem times are 
marked by increasing encOlmters with change, discontinuity, instability, complex­
ity, breaks with tradition, and (due to the division of labor, coupled with the lack of 
continuity) confmement. (Remember that increasing interconnection of a world­
historical world produces at the same time an increasing compartmentalization and 
fragmentation of individuals living in that world.) To the degree that these forces 
create difficulty, stress, unease, and discomfort - and it is hard to sec how they 
could not - there are basically two choices for fmding relief: (a) to counteract 
these forces (work against them) at some level by replacing them (if only tempo­
rarily) with stability (real or imagined, local or general), or (b) to forget them (opt 
for distraction) by substituting a different instability, which although an instability, 
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is at least a chosen one. Kitsch (as product) follows the first path (that of counter­
action), takes up the materials and techniques at hand (i.e., modem materials and 
techniques) and fashions some sort of stability from them, principally through pro­
jecting images of nature, stasis, and continuity, our separation from which bour­
geois modernity has made it difficult not to feel.  The second path could best be 
labeled entertainment (diversion, "fun": video games, action movies and televi­
sion, and perhaps even sports). 
To make a crude analogy, imagine a ship without a pilot which seems to 
be approaching a whirlpool. Most of the passengers find themselves becoming 
more and more frightened. Some of the passengers try to do something to counter­
act their precarious situation: a few strap themselves to the ship (some because 
they feel it would be best to hold onto something which floats, others simply be­
cause they have followed the safety manuals) and a few board the lifeboats (though 
the lifeboats seem just as likely to follow the ship). A certain number even resorts 
to prayer. Some of the passengers, however, take the other path (that of distraction 
and diversion): they open the hold and have a merry time with the champagne. 
(Now at the head of the ship there is a great, heavy anchor which might be able to 
save the ship, but unfortunately releasing it would probably require the strength of 
most everyone on the ship.) 
Tn any case, this move against the stresses of unstable "mechanical" mo­
dernity, this move towards placidity and tradition, explains kitsch's repeated at­
tempts to bring back the "natural."  This can be seen in the imagery of return to 
origins so ollen invoked in political campaign material, advertising, arts-and-crafts, 
and new-age culture, which (in offering itself to the kitsch defense maneuver) pro­
claims itself in turn as "natural:' "folk," "country," "valley," " home-made;' "hand­
made," "farm-fresh," "April fresh," "family values," "genuine," "organic," "time­
less," or "authentic," e.g. Mountain Spring Dawn (Dishwashing Detergent), Irish 
Spring (Deodorant Soap), Surf (Laundry Detergent), Light Scent SunRise Fresh 
Downy (Fabric Softener), Pepperidge Farm (Cookies), etc.61 This same impulse 
informs even such apparently marginal contemporary activities as witchcraft62 and 
membership in the Society for Creative Anachronism.63 Spengler noted strikingly 
similar impulses in the first half of the century: 
A weariness is spreading . . .  Men are returning to forms of life simpler 
and nearer to Nature; they are spending their time in sport instead of 
technical experiments. The great cities are becoming hateful to them . . .  
And it  is  precisely the strong and creative talents that are turning from 
the pressure of practical problems and sciences and towards pure specu­
lation. Occultism and Spiritualism, Hindu philosophies, metaphysical 
inquisitiveness under Christian or pagan coloring, all of which were 
despised in the Darwinian period, are coming up again." 
It could appear that we are dealing with merely a perennial human urge for stability 
and comfort. But what we have here is not someone closing the door against the 
rain. Rather, thcsc expressions are anti-progress, anti-rational, and anti-science � 
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and require the advent of progress, rationality, and science in the same way that 
expressly anti-Christian atheism makes little sense in the absence of Christianity.6s 
These impulses, when they are amplified, reach a level of crisis. Those 
movements which Spengler noted as the Nazis came to power reached their frui­
tion in a political culture the excesses of which find their only meaning in a crisis 
outlook. Hans Sluga notes (in Heidegger's Crisis) that, in the first decades of the 
century, the symbolism of crisis "served as common coinage . . .  passing from hand 
to hand as the metaphor for the age [which allowed] philosophers and politicians 
alike . . .  to move easily back and forth between philosophical discourse and politi­
cal rhetoric.'''' But he questions this vision of the present which sees it on a histori­
cal scale, and questions the epistemological possibility to discern, before a great 
historical turning point has passed, that a crisis is actually upon the world.67 And 
yet the very structure of modernity, with its essential discontinuity, encourages the 
crisis interpretation to be chosen. Sluga continues: 
[The 1 sense of crisis is a product of a culture of SUbjectivity in which 
the structure of individual experience is projected as the order of time 
itself. This is also the mark of modernity, and hence we are entitled to 
say that the thinkers of crisis, from Fichte through N ietzsche to 
Heidegger, are all essentially modem thinkers, even though they may 
have described themselves in other terms. Indeed, their conviction of 
having transcended modernity appears to us now as just one more ex­
pression of their moment of transition, one more sign of an essentially 
modem belief in crisis." 
The same structure appears in aesthetic modernity. Aesthetic modernity, 
which pushes the discontinuity of linear time into high relief, beyond a spirit of 
optimistic change, and into a disgust with the past and even the present, can reach 
an even more frenzied form in avant-gardism, which essentially exhibits the artist's 
vision of crisis. Calinescu observes that the concept of the avant-garde was able to 
survive the inspection it received in the 60's because it was secretly protected by its 
inner contradictions, indeed by its innumerable aporias (extreme forms of 
modernity's insoluble antinomies), and paradoxically, by its long and almost inces­
tuous association with both the idea and praxis of cultural crisis. The fact is that 
from its very outset the artistic avant-garde developed as a culture of crisis.69 
We saw in Marx's description of the development of high industry the 
double nature of modernity - a higher integration of economic effects over the 
world, coupled with an increased division of labor and life. It is precisely this 
double nature which allows the same changes in society (i.e. modernity) to be taken 
as either progress (optimistic bourgeois modernity) or decadence (negative aes­
thetic modernity).70 Marx saw modernity as both a promising tool for the future (an 
organization of the world to be taken over by the proletariat) and a horrible oppres­
sion (a fetter to the development into full humanity). And modernity as decadence, 
as oppression, as increasing fragmentation, is precisely the object against which 
kitsch also labors. 
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Kibch: A Concrete Example 
So far, our discussion has remained at a relatively theoretical level. The time has 
come to discuss a concrete example in more detail .  One of the kitsch items which 
exhibits most clearly the characteristics we have highlighted is the contemporary 
(i.e., recently produced) landscape picture. It is difficult to discuss the production 
and meanings of most of these landscapes, since they are almost all done anony­
mously - either because they are photo-litho reproductions, or because the single 
artists who produce the hand-painted pictures are not well-known (some landscape 
paintings are apparently also produced by a division of labor, in which different 
people are responsible for different elements of the painting). 
A certain number of contemporary landscape painters, however, such as 
Leroy Nieman and Bob Ross, have attained some degree of fame. 71 Leroy Nieman's 
output is available in a range of products (and prices), from original paintings, 
through limited edition serigraphs, to photo-litho reproductions for the Olympic 
games and in Playboy magazine. Owing to its dissemination principally through 
television, Bob Ross' output is even more accessible (though one can also pur­
chase Bob Ross videos, books, and painting kits). Since Bob Ross' show, "Joy of 
Painting," offers us a direct observation of the production of and, indeed, the inten­
tion behind, a popular landscape artist's work (work which our kitschographers 
would undeniably place in their pantheon/penitentiary), we shall concentrate on a 
description of the genesis of a Bob Ross painting. 
"Joy of Painting" is a weekly television how-to program which shows 
Bob Ross producing a complete landscape painting in a half-hour. n It opens with a 
title sequence in which Bob Ross uses a paint roller to fill a giant canvas (via 
Chromakey) with a finished painting in a few strokes, underscoring the ease with 
which a painting can be made. Then Bob Ross appears in front of a blank canvas, 
greets the viewers, and'begins to paint The most frequent subject in his paintings is 
a view of a mountain range through a lakeside forest Usually he begins with a wet 
canvas (the "wet-on-wet" technique), blending in a sky/water background with a 
large brush, On top of this he pokes a few white clouds, With a palette knife he 
spreads on dark, basic mountain shapes and adds highlights to the sides of the 
mountains, He blurs the base of the mountain range with a brush. He scumbles in 
background color for a forest On top of this he applies the basic tree shapes with a 
fan brush, He smears the tree colors with a brush to create the effect of reflecting 
water. He puts details in the trees, scumbles in foreground grass and bushes, and 
puts details at the water's edge. Finally, after these details, he normally paints in a 
small cabin or hut The painting is complete. 
So far we only listed the technical information of the half-hour sequence. 
But Bob Ross supplies us with much more than that This entire process is accom­
panied by a rhetorically supplied awa. His running commentary is flavored through­
out with diminutive language and reassuring asides which let us know that painting 
is not anything to be afraid of, that nothing can really go wrong, and that we are 
always in control. He paints the "little painting" on a "standard 01' pre-stretched 
canvas." '{be blender brush should be "very soft, as my rather used to say, tcndcr as 
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a mother's love." He pokes in douds: "add your own, add or subtract whatever you 
want . . .  another little cloud, you put as many clouds as you like . . .  in your world, 
you decide how many clouds live in it." When puinting a landscapcl. "we dOIl'1 
make mistakes, we just have happy accidents," and you can paint "any dream that 
you can conceive" because "in your world you have tolal and absolute power. " 
An even more important element remains. For, besides offering a non­
threatening, friendly, and inviting atmosphere, Bob Ross also permeates his com­
mentary with organic - almost animistic - metaphors. Everything "grows" or 
"lives" (one mighl even say, 'dwells'). Bob Ross lays down a few black strokes: 
"we had a mountain in our world, and it lived . . .  right here at the top." He considers 
a "big 01' tree" behind the covered bridge - "maybe he'll live over here" - and 
another: "now let's give this tree a friend . . .  there." His brush moves under the 
bridge: "the water's going to live right down here." Back in front of the bridge, 
"maybe a couple little happy trees live here . . .  maybe he had a friend."7) We wateh 
the painting slowly come to life and bring forth its own inhabitants at the cOlIunand 
of the painter. The painting, overflowing with life, is ready. "Happy painting, and 
God bless." 
As we have seen, in most cases the intention of the painter is at best con­
jecturaP4 In contrast, the Bob Ross painting appears as the conclusion to its own 
story of creation (not unlike Hegel's Phenomenology). The intention is supplied, 
not through guesses about symbolism or iconography, not through the advice of 
press kits and dealers, not even through interviews and biographical research, but 
with the painting, at every step in its development. And what is that intention? 
Precisely to supply an emotional resting place, an unbroken continuity through 
time, and a sense of connection with nature - the goals of the kitsch maneuver. (At 
this level we are simply discussing "Joy of Painting" as something being watched, 
but even to the degree that a possible application is the viewer's attaining mastery 
of a "do-it-yourself' genre, we would still be dealing with the creation of an emo­
tional resting place Urrough the viewer's painting - as production, of course. )  
We are still ietl with the question o f  the reception of such a work. Again, 
in general, theories and discussions of reception are usually weakly grounded and 
are supplied with guesses and imagination. Halle, however, has done an exemplary 
study (Inside Culture, 1 993) to determine how works are actually received. Halle 
interviewed hundreds of residents and investigated the works hung in homes from 
across the class spectrum in the New York area. Now, the received wisdom holds 
that the "easier" landscapes would find preference among the "lower" classes, that 
is, people unfamiliar with or uneducated in the fine arts or avant-garde culture. 
Contrary to this asswnption, Halle discovered that people prefer landscapes across 
the board. Not only was the preference for landscapes a feature of every class, but 
the percentage of landscapes among pictures displayed in homes was the same in 
every class (a little above 30%).7S 
This universal preference was confmned by the 1 994 installation at the 
Alternative Musewn in New York by Russian expatriate artists Komar and Melamid, 
People s Choice: The Polling of America.76 Komar and Melamid's idea was (paro­
dying political opinion polls) to conduct an opinion poll to detennine the tastes of 
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Americans regarding art, and then, using the poll as a sort of instruction manual, to 
do a series of paintings which reflected the various tastes associated with different 
income levels. The Boston firm of Mertilla & Kelly conducted the swvey, polling 
1 00 1, people nationwide. The results however came to Komar and Melamid as a 
"shock": "initially, the idea was to paint different pictures for different incomes, 
but we realized that there's no difference! The [preference for the color blue] di­
minishes with income and education, but still the color blue is the majority in every 
group. And every group wants these landscapes, with soft curveS."77 Led by the 
results oftheir pol\, Komar and Melamid went ahead with the installation, but only 
made two landscape paintings, America s Most Wanted and America s Most Un­
wanted. America s Most Wanted was a medium-sized landscape with a few "fully­
clothed" figures, and America s Most Unwanted was a small, orange-black geo­
metric abstraction, along the lines of Kandinsky. 
Even though the artists were plagued by the fear that people would only 
respond with "what people think they should say as opposed to what they truly 
[ prefcrl,"7B I lal\e's research seems to indicate that the poll respondents did for the 
most part give honest answers, since Hal\e recorded the actual work which people 
displayed in the privacy of their own homes, for their own viewing. The similarities 
between the two investigations are striking - they agree on almost every question 
of taste which appeared in both studies. lbe "People's Choice" survey found that 
outdoor scenes were preferred (88%) over indoor scenes (5%), and that, of out­
door scenes, bodies of water (49"10), forests (49"10), and rural scenes ( 1 8%) were 
preferred over man-made structures (8%).79 Presumably, Hal\e would be pleased to 
see thc results of the "People's Choice" swvey.1O 
The agreement between the studies also includes, over and above the kind 
of picture that people prefer, information pertinent to the meaning of art for its 
viewers, or the reasons for the choices they make. Haile discovered that the land­
scapes people chose for display in their homes "reflect an overwhelming prefer­
ence for a sedate and tranquil nature. Almost al\ are calm, not turbulent. Rivers 
flow serenely, oceans are placid; trees are unbent by the wind; snow lies evenly, 
fal\en, but rarely fal\ing"; he continues, "Of the 349 landscapes prominently dis­
played in the houses samples . . .  only two were turbulent. And one of these met its 
downfall during the study. ''I' Answers to queries about people's reasons for choos­
ing landscapes only confirmed this observation: "They like these pictures because 
they arc 'calm,' 'restful' ;  they offer 'solitude' and 'quiet';  they soothe."12 Like­
wisc, the "People's Choice" opinion pol\ found that people preferred art which 
made them happy (60%) and which was "relaxing to look at" (77%) 13 
We posited that kitsch was a modern coping mechanism for the general 
structure of modernity, and that it sought to produce a reverse image of modernity, 
a locus of stasis, continuity, and connection to nature. Granted that empirical inves­
tigations will only give partial results (the results of pol\s being even more open to 
question), if our theory is right, it must stil\ say something about the real world. 
With the little direct or solid evidence availahle, what have we heen able to con­
firm? 'Ibe kitsch mechanism described above (as a coping mechanism) does in­
deed seem to explain the phenomena in question. In particular. we have been able 
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to find evidence relating to thl: cOlltent in and intcntion behind the production of 
the contemporary landscape picture (taken as a paradigm kitsch object), and the 
content of and intention behind its reception. As Matisse put it, art is analogous to 
"a good armchair which provides relaxation from physical fatigue."84 
Kitsch and Art 
Now why should we end a discussion of the kitsch mechanism with a Matissc quote 
on the function of art? Precisely to underscore their affinity. For if both ' fine' (mod­
em, abstract) art and kitsch have as their primary function a counter-movement to 
modernity, as it were an emotional negative print of modernity, then obviously the 
two are similar in a very important way, and not, as Greenberg asserted, mortal 
enemies. Indeed, it seems that the basic difference between the two is that 'fine' art 
has, over and above its primary emotional functions, additional 'intellectual' func­
tions, or at the very least stylistic, formal, or contextual markers which allow it to 
more easily perform another, possibly Wlrelated task as an object of ' fine' art. 
As we saw earlier in Doffles' treatment of the range of kitsch, kitsch did 
not occur before the advent of modernity because (among other reasons) in pre­
modern societies, art had a different historical function. lbis points to another 
aspect of kitsch: kitsch analY.led as an art form. There are a number of ways to 
understand this. The first involves utility: in general we could say that kitsch docs 
not serve a 'physical' purpose, but an emotional or symbolic one. By this criterion, 
then, a wedge of wood which scrves as a doorstop, or a metal container tor serving 
coffee, would be tools for accomplishing some physical goal, whereas a stuffed 
animal or postcard of a kitten serve primarily emotional purposes. lbis distinction, 
however, can become problematic, because there are for instance door "cosies" (or 
"mufflers") fashioned in the shape of a snake (some people call them "door snakes")ti5 
and teapots in the shape of a cat. In such cases, perhaps the answer is to ask if the 
object fills the emotional role, and not whether it fills it exclusively. 
Another approach is to consider forms: kitsch appears in the forms which 
are recognized as art forms, e.g., paintings, photographs, sculptures, monuments, 
novels, plays, films, etc., even if it is said of kitsch items that they are "merely 
analogous" to the "real" art forms. Indeed, the objects which are referred to as 
"traditional kitsch" (kitsch in its narrower understanding, such as bric-a-brac, lawn 
ornaments, rustic paintings) fall generally into the categories of sculpture and paint­
ing (or at least "pictures"). Finally, the status of kitsch as a variety of art can be seen 
in that it is marked as such, principally through the practice of display. Displaying 
involves placing an object in a place which is easy to see, and which is marked as 
a place for looking, such as within a frame or on a pedestal (loosely understood) or 
both." 
Umberto Eco is one person (inter alia!) who argues for a strong distinc­
tion between 'fme' art and kitsch. One of Eco's central arguments in "The Struc­
ture of Bad Taste" is that kitsch is consumed by people who are too uneducated and 
too busy to "decode" the complex information stored in 'fme' art, and yet desiring 
something akin to a 'fine' art experience, instead consume kitsch which has bor­
rowed 'fme' art "stylemes" but which offers these in an unintegrated fashion and 
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for immediate consumption.17 Here we see a discussion which applies aspects of a 
more developed approach to kitsch (the discussion of structural and technique is­
sue as well as subjective reactions in a modern context) but which falls short on the 
class caveat. B1 
Furthermore, Halle's research shows that those who belong to the 'upper' 
classes receive abstract art in much the same way as they do landscapes: as a sooth­
ing decoration. Even those whose attraction to abstract art is that abstract art 
"unleash! es] the creative imagination," when asked where their "unleashed" imagi­
nation goes, responded half of the time that they imagine landscapes!1I9 Of those 
who did not imagine landscapes, most of the remainder reported family motifs and 
rclationships between people coming to mind - the very material of the family 
snapshots that are a close second to landscapes in universal popularity. 90 Again the 
most reasonable conclusion is that the function of even abstract art is more akin to 
that of kitsch than opposed. 
In summary, it would seem that if there were a difference between 'fine' 
art and kitsch paintings, it would be that 'fine' art has markers or involves a recep­
tion context which allows it to also take on a additional 'intellectual' task, presum­
ably for artists, dealers, critics, scholars, and upper-level students. But this does 
not seem to touch the essence of what the works accomplish, merely an additional 
function.91 
ConcJu5ions 
What, thcn, have we accomplished? We have reviewed the variety of kitsch con­
cepts and placed them into an order of kitsch qualities, formal structures, and sub­
jcctive aspects. We have discarded kitsch conceptions which were overly depen­
dent upon unexamined assumptions about class, race, and gender differences. In 
doing this, we arrived at a kitsch conception which concentrates on subjective ele­
ments in their relation to the complex known as modernity. By this means we see 
that there is focal point for a legitimate investigation of kitsch. Using this focus, we 
see that the kitsch object is best understood as a tool in a struggle against the par­
ticular stresses of the modem world, insofar as that struggle in understood as an 
attempt to provide (at least) temporary relief, a place for recovery. Finally, this 
conception was tcsted against the most direct evidence available. 
What do these accomplishments mean, at least practically? At the very 
Icast it seems that positing a stark or absolute contrast between kitsch and fine art is 
unjustifiable; both exhibit the same roots and have the same goals (though it ap­
pears that fine arts add some others). Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, 
wc should view the impUlse to extend such absolute value judgments of the con­
sumers of kitsch with suspicion, including when we are the targets of those judg­
mcnts. In my own case, it should be clear that my teenage journal entries conform 
to thc kitsch concept here developed, and that this conception makes my entries 
more understandable - at least to the degree that they exhibit any general tendcn­
cics. Evcn if one should wish to examine the kitseh mechanism under a harsher 
light, it seems that approaching it as a psychic diseasc would be unfruitful, given 
that it is a part of a general human defense strategy, a healing process, an expres-
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sion of the pysche's own strength. 
Granted, over the coursc of this investigation a great simpliiication has 
occurred. Our conception of kitsch is still inadequate to that multiplicity and un­
ending variety which falls under the rubric of "kitsch"; nonetheless, with our con­
ception, a wide range of kitsch entities can be legitimately grasped and basically 
understood. There may indeed be a great nwnber of particular aspects which will 
forever elude a rational explanation, but then again these have not been the focus of 
our energies. 
NOTES 
This essay was delivered in earlier versions as a paper at the Graduate Student 
Colloquium, "Kitsch and Collecting" (together with Kevin Melchionne; comments by 
Prof. Robert Crease and David Salz), on Sept. 28, 1 995 at SUNY Stony Brook and as 
a guest lecture ("Der Kitsch gegen das Moderne") in A. 10rgens-Kirschholf's course 
"Kunst und Trivialkultur" (WS 97) on lan. 2 1  and 29, 1 997, at the Universitiit 
TObingen. I gratefully thank Profs. David Allison, Edward Casey, Robert Crease, and 
Donald Kuspit (all of SUNY Stony Brook) for their support and guidance as 1 
worked on this essay. The artist Nancy Romines of New York City also made many 
useful comments on an early draft of the work. 
2 Gillo Dorfles, ed., Kitsch: The World of Bad Taste (New York: Bell Publishing, 
1 969). Some information on the translation of Dorfles' Kitsch can be found in 
Tadeusz Pavlowski, "The Varieties of Kitsch," Dialectics and Humanism, no. 4 
( 1 977), 1 05, n. 1 .  Richard Egenter's book claims to be the first on the subject to 
appear in English, but deals almost exclusively with religious art (The Desecration of 
Christ, ed. Nicolete Gray, trans. Edward Quinn [Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 
1 967], 10). 
3 Three ofthe essays are by the reigning 'kitschographers' at the time of Dorl1es' book: 
Clement Greenberg (whose "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" had reached quasi-canonical 
status), Hermann Broch, and Ludwig Giesz. Subtopics treated included politics, the 
family, death, film, pornography, and architecture. References to those authors will 
first give the page from the original (or parent-language) source, followed by the 
corresponding page of the Dorfles' English translation, if available. I have used the 
Greenberg "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" essay from Art and Culture: Critical Essays 
(Boston: Beacon Press, (965): 3-2 1 . Likewise, though the Broch essay excerpted by 
Dorfles was taken from Broch's Dichlen und Erkennen, Vol. 1 (Zurich: Rhein-Verlag, 
1 955), my references are to the more recent Schriflen zur Literatur 2: Theorie, Ed. 
Paul Michael LQtzeler (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1 975). References to 
Giesz use "Der 'Kitsch-Mensch' als Tourist" in his Phiinomenologie des Kitsches, 
2nd ed. (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1 97 1 ): 75-84. 
4 "More appalling pictures than you can shake a stick at," says the New York 71mes 
back-cover blurb [no date supplied]. 
5 Curtis Brown, Slar-Spangled Kitsch: An Astounding and Tastelessly J /lustrated 
Exploralion of the Bawdy, Gaudy, Shoddy Mass-Arl Cullure in This Great Land oj 
Ours (New York: Universe Books, 1 975), 200. 
6 Its subtitle captures this jovial tone perfectly, and may be exactly the sort of phenom-
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enon Harold Rosenberg had in mind when he spoke of "kitsch criticism of kitsch" 
("Pop Culture: Kitsch Criticism" in The Tradition o/the New [New York: McGraw­
Hill, 1 965], 261 ). Cf. Ludwig Gicsz' observation, "It is infinitely simple to list mass­
produced [objects J in bad taste and without any artistic value, and to criticize their 
faults either kindly or mercilessly. There are countless albums and anthologies which 
serve this purpose" (75lDorfles, 1 56). There is reason to doubt that Dorfles' book 
escapes Giesz' characterization - which it of course contains! The idea of "kitsch 
criticism of kitsch" is also taken up by Haroldo de Campos in "Vanguarda e Kitsch," 
A Arle no /forizonle do Provavel (SAo Paulo: Editora Perspectiva, 1 969), 1 95-196. In 
the case of Brown's book at least, given its less biting tone, one could perhaps argue 
that it is an attempt at a criticism through good-natured humor (of the type advocated 
by the Earl of Shaftesbury), and if so, is perhaps the more 'effective' criticism. 
7 Op. cit., I I .  
8 An example of which could be Thornton Wilder's play, Our Town, which blends 
futuristl'non-objective' theater technique with full-blown narrative. 
9 The complexity and ambivalence surrounding kitsch can be seen in the example of 
Milan Kunders's novel, The Unbearable Lightness o/Being, which I have heard 
called kitsch, which is a meditation on kitsch, and which includes a particularly 
schmaltzy scene involving a pet near its end. It first appeared in English in the pages 
of·- what else? - The New Yorker, and the passage of the novel there selected dealt 
precisely with kitsch. (Prof. Robert Crease reminded me of the novel's discussion of 
kitsch.) 
10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., Ed. Robert C. 
Tuckcr (New York: w.w. Norton &; Co., 1 978), 7. 
I I  David Halle makes this charge in Inside Culture: Art and Class in Ihe American 
Home (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 986), 5-1 1 (esp. 6 and 7) and 1 20. 
This issue will be further discussed under the topic of "corroboration" (see n. 2 1 ). 
1 2  I should note at the beginning that 1 am discussing kitsch qua kitsch - not kitsch 
which has been taken up in an ironic fashion, such as the case of someone who buys 
kitsch precisely because the items seem ugly and in bad taste. I am reflecting upon 
"innocent" kitsch. In a strange parallel to the impossibility of reflecting upon one's 
own mind immediately (contemplating one's own experiences always pushes them 
one step away), the label of kitsch under discussion points to kitsch as it exists before 
it has been labelled as such. Put simply, I am here focusing on first-order, non-self­
conscious kitsch. 
1 3  Dorfles, 280-289. 
14 Op. cit., 292. 
I S  Op cit., I 58/Dortles, 49. 
16 Op. cit., 89. 
17 Not to mention self-contradictory - compare from our list of representative terms, 
e.g. "chaste" and "obscene"! 
I R Op. cit.. 105-1 06. His typology consists of eight oppositions: 
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I .  "Kitsch as a product of human action versus kitsch man, kitsch atti­
tude. kitsch experience, and kitsch behaviour." 
2. "Intentional and non-intentional kitsch lin reference to the artist's 
intention ) ." 
3 .  "Kitsch characterized internally and externally" [structure of kitsch 
object vs. comparison between objects. usually between one which is 
original and anothcr which is derivative). 
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· 4. "Kitsch as a natural creation and as a human product." 
5. "Relative and absolute concept ofkitsch" lkitsch as a bad quality vs. 
kitsch as being such within a certain range of I:omparisonl .  
6. "Subjective and objel:tive I:onl:ept of  kitsl:h." 
7. "Classifil:atory and oomparative concept of kitsch." 
8. "Historical and universal ooncept of kitsch" [ 1 05-106). 
This paper will be taking up principally ( I ), (2), and (6), which seem to me to amount 
to the same thing, and also a consideration of kitsch as product produl:ed and product 
oonsumed. 
19 Op. cit., 1 1 5 .  
20 Pierre Bourdieu, The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger, Trans. Petcr Collier 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1 99 1 ), 20-2 1 .  Though Bourdieu is discussing the attempt to 
sort out the variety of Nazi writers, we may note that the cultural produl:ts of the 
Nazis have not infrequently been I:riticized for their kitschiness! Cf. Hermann Wein, 
"Nietzsche und Fasl:hismus," Club Voltaire: Juhrbuchfiir krilische Aujklanmg, no. 
4, ( 1 970), 332-341 : 335; Saul Friedlander, Reflections on Nazism: Essays on Kitsch 
and Death, trans. Thomas Weyr (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1 993); and 
of oourse, Greenberg's "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," op. I:it. 
2 1  Op. I:it., 1 07-108. "Authors writing about kitsch often refer to an intentional property, 
but they do not always substantiate their statements in a clear and mt:thodologil:ally 
oorrect manner. Even if they do make a oonscious effort to ascertain the intention of 
an artist, they I:an do it only indirectly by way of drawing I:onclusions from observa­
tions of the kitsch object and from available external information" ( 1 07-108). The 
question of corroboration is also touched on a number of times in Robert C. 
Solomon, "On Kitsch and Sentimentality," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, Vol. 49 no. I (Winter 199 1 ), 1 -14, and, as we have seen, discussed directly 
in Halle (n. I I ). 
22 Op. cit., 1 08. 
23 The word "class" is usually taken by 'kitschographers' to refer to a directly propor­
tionate relationship between (a) inoome and economic/social level and (b) education. 
acculturation, and accumulation of "cultural capital."  The question however is 
whether these two are always lound togcthcr; this qucstion is touchcd on C.g. ill 
Greenberg, 8-9. In the immediatcly lollowing discussion of status-seeking, the lOCus 
is on acculturation (to "high" culture). seen as a means to a higher social position. 
24 See Umberto Eco, "The Structure of Bad Taste," in The Open Work, trans. Anna 
Cancogni (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 989), 1 80-2 1 6  (we will 
discuss this in more detail latcr); Greenberg on kitsch as "ersatz culture" ( 1 965) l O­
I I  and 1 5- 16  [Oodles: 1 1 6); and de Campos 198-20 1 .  The following discussion 
utilizes Halle's observations, but Andrew Ross also subjects the status argument to 
scrutiny in No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 
1989), 58-64. Both Halle and Ross bring a good amount of attention to the status 
argument put forward in Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the 
Judgment of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1 984), passim. 
25 . Op. cit., 80. 
26 David Denby, "Love Affair," New York Magazine (November 7, 1994), 97; the Lenin 
quote is from V. I. Lenin, On Literature and Art (Mosoow: Progress Publishers, 
1967), 226, cited in David Laing. The Marxist Theory of Art: An Introductory Survey 
(Bou1der,_Colorado: Westview Press, 1978), 1 35, n. 5 .  Robert C. Solomon's detailed 
essay defends sentimentality against the various attacks it routinely suffers. 
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Rosenberg's comment that "kitsch is much more likely [than art] to exclude personal 
malice" (264), at least, eonfonns to the basic idea behind Solomon's essay. 
27 Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, trans. 
John T. Goldwaith (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 99 1 ). 
28 for example, though it is often said that women are traditionally associated with 
nature and men with culture, and that therefore women are seen as more emotional 
and men as more self-eontrolled, there exists at the same time a traditional opposition 
which posits women as more civilized than men, less likely to allow themselves to get 
dirty. and more sensitive in general, whereas men are seen as the type to go hunting 
in the woods, to pursue blood sport like an animal, and to get covered in mud without 
hesitation in doing so (Kant remarks e.g. that women "are cleanly and very delicate in 
respect to all that provokes disgust," [ibid., 77] and have made "men's customs . . .  
gentler, their conduct more polite and refined, and their bearing more elegant" £ibid., 
95 I). One explanation for this apparent contradiction is that the more "natural" 
woman is seen as belonging to the home, whereas the more "cultural" men are placed 
outside the home, whether that home is in an urban or forest dwelling. At any rate, it 
is a complex phenomenon. Added to this is the debate over whether the traditionally 
ascribed gender roles should be equally valorized. reversed. combined. or abandoned 
altogether. 
As concerns race categories (about which 1 am still not well-enough infonned), these 
too should be treated with caution. In relation to kitsch, it may be noted that the same 
idea of polarization and mutual interpenetration often posited between kitsch and the 
avant-garde (stealing and appropriation of kitsch by the avant-garde vs. adulteration 
and cooptation of the avant-garde by kitsch [cf. Dodles, Eco, et al. ] )  can be set up in 
regard to categories of "authentic" and "inauthentic" black culture. And yet "white" 
and "black" music. for example, are very hard to completely separate and distinguish 
( sce the boggling symbiosis described in Ross, op. cit., 67-68]. On the other hand, 
Curtis Brown's Star-Spangled Kitsch often makes kitsch a target of his good­
humored criticism precisely for its racism. 
29 The concept of the "kitsch-mensch" was first proposed by Broch, adapted by Giesz. 
and finally used as a core concept for the Dorfles anthology (see in particular Broch. 
I S8 lDorfles, 49; Giesz, 8, 77lDorfles, 1 59; and Dodles, 4 .  
30 Egenter characterizes kitsch as a tool of Satan for obstructing souls from reaching 
God [op. cit.. 1 3- 1 4], but Broch's discussions are just as extreme: "He who produces 
kitsch is not one who produces low-quality art, he is no figure of little or no ability, 
he is definitely not to be judged according to the standards of aesthetics, rather he is 
. . . •  to get to the point, a bad person, he is an ethically depraved person, a criminal 
who desires the radically evil. Or, put less dramatically: he is a pig. For kitsch is the 
evil itself within art. Would you like a colossal example of kitsch? - Nero playing to 
the fireworks of burning Christians: the specific dilettante, the specific aesthete, who 
docs cverything for the sake of beautiful effects" (op. cit., 95, my translation. Cf. also 
p. I 54lDorfles, 76). 
Incidentally. concerning Egenter's opinion of the relation between kitsch and Jesus, a 
dissenting voice can be found in Hans Conrad Zaner. a fonner Dominican monk who 
writes of his life in the monastery that he then "experienced the verses from the Old 
Testament as primal, powerful. and true. i\nd the verses from the New Testament as 
kitsch" (Ecce Jesus: Ein An.�chlag gegen den neuen religiOsen Kitsch [Reinbeck bei 
Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1 992]), 1 2 .  
3 1  Op. cit., p. 1 7 1 1D0rfles, 65. 
32 Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of Modernity: Modernity, Avant-Garde, Decadence, 
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Kitsch, Postmodemism, 2nd cd .. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1987). I should 
thank Prof. David Hertz of Indiana University, l3Ioomington, lor directing me to this 
book. 
33 These pan-historical possibilities have indeed been taken up, as we have seen in the 
case of Broch, who, though he characterizes kitsch as the offspring of Romanticism, 
draws comparisons between his "kitsch-mensch" and Nero's aestheticization of 
torture In. 30). As we shall see, Giesz takes a similar stance. 
34 Op. cit., 1 1-12.  
35 Ibid., 10.  
36 Ibid., 40, 32, 1 07. 
37 Ibid., 20, 3 1 , 94-95, etc. 
38 Broch, 1 62-1 66, Oodles, 54-59. 
39 Op. cit., 9.  
40 Op. cit., 26. "[I)t is almost impossible to judge the 'kitschiness' of a translated 
passage or even a piece wrillen some twenty years before," ad loc. 
41 Dorfles' comments on comics for example ("such stupid and utterly dull ligures as 
Superman and Batman," 40) give me the impression of someone who is indeed 
familiar with, but who does not however know, them. Of course, the whole point of 
such continuously derogatory rhetoric is to demonstrate a proper distance. 
42 Op. cit., 75-84lDorfles, 1 56-1 74. 
43 Ad loc. 
44 Giesz uses elements of the psyche kindred with Heidegger's existentialia or human 
"categories" (Being and nme, Trans., John Maquarrie and Edward Robinson I San 
Francisco: Harper, 1 962), §9, 70). But his indebtedness to Heidegger is also 
linguistically indicated. This indebtedness, palpable in the German, is dulled in the 
English translation of Dorfles' anthology. The English "[a)nalyzed from the existen­
tialist point of view," 1 62, for example, translates Giesz' "[d)aseinsanalytisch 
betrachtet," 78. My impression is that the English translation suffers because it is a 
translation from the Italian, itself presumably translated from the Giesz' German 
original. At any rate, the German is appreciably clearer than the Oodles translation 
- was the English perhaps intentionally aimed at a 'lower' American audience, 
'kitschified'1 
45 See esp. ibid., 78-81/Dorfles, 162-166. 
46 Ibid., 79/Oorfles, 163. This comparison was more recently taken up in a discussion of 
ancient religious relics as momentos and souvenirs in Vicki Goldberg, "In Search of 
Diana of Epheseus," New York nmes (August 2 1 ,  ( 994), sec.2, H33. 
47 Our discussion will (as will become clear) cite principally Marx, but we may indicate 
others: Dick Howard, From Marx to Kant, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1 993), esp. 34; and Greenberg, op. cit., 5-7. 
48 This development was worked out in particular by Greenberg. Besides the passages 
already indicated from "Avant-Garde and Kitsch," see his "Towards a Newer 
Laocoon," Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays and Criticism, Vol. I ,  Ed. John 
O'Brian (Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1 986), 23-38. Later, non-formalist 
developments in the art world have their parallels in other modem forms of the 
division of labor such as free-lancing and multiple-task work also described by Marx. 
49 Op. cit., 1 72.  
50 Op. cit., 1 80-1 86, 1 90. Martin Heidegger makes strikingly similar observations. Hc 
had aligned with a party which saw itself as an alternative to both modernity 
(America) and one response to it (communism) - "between two great pinccrs"; his 
vision, too, was thus a response to the challenge of modernity. He describes the same 
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world-historical world as Marx ("when any occurrence, in any place and any time, 
has become accessible at any speed, when an attempt on the life of the King of 
France and a symphonic concert can be lived at the same time") and his questions, 
"What for? Where to? - And what now?" echo Lenin's "What is to be done?" from 
33 ycars before. All quotes (except Lenin) are modified from Martin Heidegger, An 
Introduction to Metaphysics 2nd ed., trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City, New York: 
Anchor Books, 1 96 1 ), 3 1 ,  as cited in Concei�io Neves Gmeiner, "Martin Heidegger 
e o  Nacional-Socialismo," Leopold/anum, Vol .  2, no. 1 ( 1 975), 3-2. 
5 1  Op. cit., 5, 7, 1 0, 1 9-22, 4 1 -42. 
52 Op. cit., p. 1 O. 
53 Calinescu notes: "The overall traditionalism of the Middle Ages and the prevailing 
medieval disregard of historical time, made up of unique, un repeatable moments, go 
against the deep sense of historicity implied by Christianity's philosophy of time. The 
paradoxical view of the Middle Ages' rejection of the original Christian notion of 
time has been convincingly argued by Denis de Rougement in Man :, Modem Quest, 
trans. Montgomery Belgion (New York: Harper, 1 957). To the revolutionary 
challenge of the Christian time, Denis de Rougement writes, 'the middle ages resisted 
by going back to cyclical conceptions and by a sharp limitation upon the size of the 
past and the future: the effect of the kind of congelation of time which this entailed 
was the elimination of all becoming' (95). According to de Rougement, 'the Middlc 
Ages were the "Eastern" period of Europc,' because of their 'growing propensity . . .  
to substitute tradition, mythical allegory, and legend for the facts which only 
Scripture, very little read at the time, showed to be historical. 1\11 this strengthens my 
view that the Middle Ages, far from standing for some "golden age of Christianity" 
- as the Romantics were the first to allege and has been repeated ad nauseum ever 
since - were rather, generally speaking, a long defensive reaction against the 
rcvolutionary ferment introduced into the world by the Gospel' (90)," 3 1 3-3 1 4, n.4. 
54 Perhaps the epitome of radical difference in the succession of time can be found in 
Heidegger's description of the Hegelian presentation of time, a succession of "nows" 
cach of which is "either 'now' is-no-Ionger, or now is-not-yet" - in other words, 
completely different from the singular "point" of the now in the present, which 
conception however "mov[esJ wholly in the direction of the way time is ordinarily 
understood" (Being and Time, 483). 
S5 Op. cit., 10 .  
S6 Ibid., 4 1 -42. 
57 Ad loc. 
58 Ibid., 92. 
59 The great interconnectedness of the immanent and linear conceptions of modernity 
re�lUlts in their often being conllated or discussed in the same breath. The implica­
tions of both conceptions play out in Wittgenstein's comment, "It sounds too simple: 
the difference between magic and science can be expressed in [the fact] that there is a 
progress to science, but not in magic. Magic has no direction of development which 
lies internal to it" (trans. altered] (Remarks on Frazer s Golden Bough, Trans. I\. C. 
Miles (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1 99 1 ], 1 3); 
cf. Foucault's account: "A profound historicity penetrates into the heart of things, 
isolates and delines them in their own coherence, imposes upon them the forms or 
order implied by the continuity of time .. .  things become increasingly rellexive, 
seeking the principle of their intelligibility only in their own development" (The 
Order o/Things: An Archae% K)' of the Human Sciences, Trans. anon. [New York: 
Random I·louse, 1 973 J, xxiii ). 
76 ART CRITICISM 
60 This thesis is greatly indebted to Calinescu (see esp. his Introduction and 246-248). 
61 We could extend our list with the brand names noted by Adorno, albeit in a dillerent 
context: "Jjlgermeister, Alte Klosterfrau, Schanke" ("Master Hunter, Old Nun, Ye 
aide Tavern"; 11,e Jargon 0/ Authenticity, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will 
[Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1 973), 44) 
62 Referring to what she calls "cosmic feminism" or "ecofeminism," Kathy E. Ferguson 
notes that it "typically invokers) the political and epistemological possibilities of 
transcendence and return . . .  invoking the traditions of premodern societies . . .  as 
sources for cosmic feminism's struggles against modernity," this modernity being 
seen as "the gradual attack on and erosion of the boundary between wilderness and 
civilization" (The Man Problem: Visions o/Subjectivity in Feminist Theory [ Berke­
ley: University of California Press, 1 993J, 98-1 00). 
63 An organization with clubs across the United States which establishes imaginary 
medieval societies, complete with royal titles, jousting, sword fights, and unicorn 
dolls. 
64 Man and Technics (London: Allen and Unwin, 1 932), 97, as cited in Bourdieu, 
Political On/ology, op. cit., I I .  The italics are Bourdieu's. 
65 Ferguson notes: "Any vision of early societies available to the residents of modernity, 
no matter what their spiritual sympathies, is a version filtered through modernity's 
categories and affected by its conquests," op. cit., 1 00. 
66 Hans Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (Cam­
bridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1 993), 6 1 .  
67 Ibid., 65. 
68 Ibid., 73-74. As regards the Nazis in particular, Sluga warns: "the notion of great 
crisis that motivated Fichte, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Nazis is, to use Foucault's 
words, one of the most destructive habits of modem thought. The idea promises us an 
unconditional liberation from whatever we have found constraining in the past. It 
promises a moment oftransformation and a world that is in no way like the old one. 
h loosens all moral and traditional bonds and projects the right to total freedom. 
Nietzsche wrote that 'individuals and generations can now fix their eyes on tasks of a 
vastness that would have seemed madness in earlier ages, and a trifling with Heaven 
and Hell. We may experiment with ourselves! Yes, mankind has the right to do that.' 
He could not foresee that National Socialism would teach us a quick and ugly lesson 
concerning the perils of all such experimentation." To this he cites Foucault's 
rejoinder: "One must probably have the humility to admit that the time of one's own 
life is not the one-time, basic, revolutionary moment of history, from which 
everything begins and is completed" [73-74). (We should note that the equality of 
Nietzsche's conception of experimentation and that of the Nazis is still in debate. )  
I should clarifY here that I d o  not wish t o  say that kitsch i s  always beneficial. 
Though I am in general arguing against the idea of seeing kitsch as a sickness or 
virus, my analysis refers mainly to kitsch when it is a tool for creating a domestic 
sanctuary; but when such tactics are applied on a large, national-political scale, then 
kitsch becomes questionable, even dangerous. The Nazis are a case in point, but 
Reagan's "Morning in America" television campaign ads move in the same direction. 
69 Op. cit., 1 23-124. 
70 Compare the futurist f. T. Marinetti and the dadaist Hugo Ball. Items #4 and 119 of 
Marinetti's futurist manifesto assert: "We declare that the splendor of the world has 
been enriched with a new form of beauty, the beauty of speed." and "We will glorily 
war - the only true hygiene of the world . . ... ("The Foundation of Futurism" ( 1 908), 
from Theories o/Modem Art: A Source Book by Artists and Critics, ed. Herschel B. 
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Chipp [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 968], pp. 284-289: p.284). In 
opposition to this, Hugo Ball writes in his diaries: "The war is based on a crass error. 
Men have been mistaken for machines. Machines, not men, should be decimated. At 
some future date, when only machines march, things will be better. Then everyone 
will be right to rejoice when they all demolish each other" (Flight Out ofnme (1910-
1924), ed. John Elderfeld, trans. Ann Raimes [New York: Viking Press, 1 974], entry 
for July 26, 1 9 1 5, p. 22). In regard to the simultaneous ability of progress to equal 
decadence, one may note an odd linguistic coincidence: the word "modem" in 
German can also mean "decaying." 
71 Also worthy of mention are Mark King. a Leroy Nieman imitator (or at least a 
competitor for Nieman's market), and Alexander, Bob Ross' predecessor and mentor, 
whom (as far as I can tell) Bob Ross long ago superseded. 
72 This description relies upon a number of broadcasts during the month of August, 
1 994, on WNYE, Channel 25, in new York, and WLlW, channel 2 1 ,  in Long Island. 
All quoted material was transcribed live from these broadcasts. 
I should mention that Bob Ross died on July 4, 1 995; I believe his son will be taking 
over the television show. Examples of Bob Ross' painting can be seen at his 
company's webpage, http://www.bobross.com/. which includes pictures of paintings 
by people who have applied his do-it-yourself techniques. 
The artist Alix Lambert curated an interesting exhibit, "Joy of Painting," involving 
Bob Ross' television show; the show took place at the cultural center HERE, in New 
York City in January of 1 995. She distributed copies of a Bob Ross instructional 
video to various artists and had them paint from it. The video and the resulting works 
formed the basis of the exhibit. The paintings shown exhibited the entire range of 
reactions, from faithful - even loving - reproduction to passionate hatred. 
73 Unless I am mistaken, all of the life forms in Ross' paintings answer to "he." 
74 Cf. the Preface and the discussion of Pawlowski. 
75 Op cit., pp.59-6 1 .  The next most popular subject for display in homes is the portrait, 
almost exclusively of members ofthe nuclear family, pp.87-1 1 8  (ch. 3). It should be 
noted that this investigation of taste via art displayed in homes is skewed in one 
important way - toward homeowners, that is, people arguably predisposed to seek 
stability. This focus also leaves out another type of domestic projection which still 
needs explanation, namely, the decorations native to the teenager's room, usually 
collages of magazine clippings, posters, postcards, photographs, and assorted cultural 
flotsam and jetsam, sometimes completely covering over the original surface of the 
wall. It seems that we are again dealing with diversion from modernity. To argue that 
younger people do not mind the constant upheaval of modernity would be to ignore 
thc undeniable pain brought about by broken families and frequent moving, two 
increasingly frequent conditions brought about by the modem situation. 
76 Alex Komar and Vitaly Melamid, "Painting by Numbers: The Search for a People's 
Art" (interview), op. cit., Vol. 258, no. 1 0  (March 1 4, 1 994), pp. 334-348, and Victor 
Navasky, "People's Artists," The Nation op. cit., pp. 328-329. 
77 Ibid , pp.342-343. 
78 Ibid . p.343. 
79 Ibid , p.340. 
80 The survey (and painting) was then performed for Russia, with essentially the same 
results (Susannah Cassedy O'Donnell, "The People Speak: ' Blue Landscape, 
78 
Please, '" Museum News [NovemberfDecember 1 994], 9- 1 0, 26). As of 1 998, the 
survey has been performed repeatedly across the globe, including such countries as 
Turkey and Kenya. Again and again, the poll returned the same results - landscapes 
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are preferred over abstractions or interiors. The only exceptions were Holland (which 
"most wanted" a small abstraction consisting of bright, swirling colors -- as over 
against a brownish interior scene) and possibly Germany and Italy, whose "most 
wanted" landscapes were a little off the beaten track ._- or were Komar and Melamid 
getting tired of painting the same landscapes? (All of the paintings can be viewed at 
the Dia Center's webpage at http://www.diacenter.org/kmlpainting.html/.) 
8 1  Op. cit., 69. 
82 Ad loc. In more detail, "A Manhattan man, about a Chinese garden sccne, with 
mountains in the background: 'It's so calm. That's what I like about it.' A Manhattan 
woman, on her photographs of the coasts of Greece and Mexico: 'They have a leeling 
of solitude, beauty, quiet, and peace.'  A Grcenpoint woman, on a landscape of trees 
and a river: 'It's very restful.' Another Grecnpoint woman, on a rural street scene 
lined with autumn trees: ' It's peaceful and restful.' A Manhasset man, about two 
beach scenes: 'They're peaceful. '  A Medford woman about a beach scene, with 
seagulls but no people: 'I like it because it's tranquil. No one bothers you'" [69-70. 
The Manhattan households were the upper-class urban homes, Manhasset upper 
middle-class suburban, Grecnpoint working- and lower middle-class urban, and 
Medford working- and lower middle-class suburban). Another common aspect of thc 
landscapes Halle studied was that they depicted no people; of the landscapes that did 
show people, they were almost all of landscapes of previous historical periods, while 
the "depopulated" landscapes were usually of modem-day vistas. 
83 Op. cit., 343. Again, it may be that the "People's Choice" poll might partially renect 
what people believed they would choose, as opposed to what they actually had 
chosen or do choose. 
84 Cited in Halle, 72. Halle contends that the basic reasons behind peoplc's pretcrcncc 
for calm landscapes relate to "an orientation to nature as the arena for leisure" (a) 
because the "home, and viewing landscape therein, offers some respite from the 
perceived hustle and hubbub of the outside world, especially the world of work" or 
(b) because "the modem orientation to nature [is] as scenery 10 drive past . . .  or as the 
arena for trips and leisure time" (72-73). This contention could probably be takcn as 
either backing up or contradicting my thesis. 
85 The name for these objects, as can be seen, is hard to nail down. One mail-order 
catalog lists them as "Draft Dodgers" (the copywriters apparently misscd the possible 
political connotations of the name - unless they meant to say that "draft dodgers" 
are snakes!). Thanks to Liz French for bringing the catalog my attcntion. 
86 On "display" as a constitutive oCart, see Halle (95, 1 1 1 - 1 1 2, and 1 20). This has been 
ra.ther intuitively summed up by David laChapelle: "The way I see it, the magazines 
are the galleries . . .  And the museum is the refrigerator. If someone rips out the photo 
and puts it on the fridge, that really is something" (Amy M. Spindler, "Mixing Dada, 
Cher, Middle Ameries," New York nmes, [November 29, 1 994), 8 14). 
87 Op. cit., 200-205 .  
8 8  Cf. the discussion of the "status" argument i n  the "Deduction o f  Kitsch" section. 
89 Op. cit., 1 32-1 34. On a more anecdotal plane, in an interview with Doris Lessing 
which took place at the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, Lessing expressed 
disdain for most of the "abstract" sculptures and paintings in the exhibition, "The 
Italian Metamorphosis 1 943-1 968," but (reports Diana Jean Schemo) eventually 
Lessing "warms to a few of the works. In a 1 96 1  sculpture called 'White Fire' by 
Fausto Melotti, she sees a castle. Lucio Fontana's 'Spatial Concept. Expectations, ' 
colored panels with almond-shaped slits, reminds her of the seashore" ("A Portrait 
Unwinds, As In Life," New York TImes [November 2, 1 994], C IO). Likewise, we 
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discover that Greenberg spent his spare time at the end of his life painting landscapes 
(Robert Burstow, "00 Art and Politics," interview with Greenberg, Frieze, Issue 1 8  
[September/October 1994], 33). 
90 Halle, op. cit., 1 32-1 34. 
9 1  As far as the question of "post modem" art is concerned, for now ali I can offer is 
preliminary. If "postmodern" art does, as is sometimes held, not have relief or stasis 
as its goal, but instead further alienation, then it would apparently conform to the 
description of a reaction to modernity that walks with it (entertainment), or tries to 
run ahead of it, instead of standing against it. 00 postmodernism as 
'hypermodernism,' David E. Pettigrew notes: "Kant and Freud's fragmentation of the 
subject, their critical identification of the illusory metanarratives of reason, and their 
necessary recourse to the ir-rational, serve to debunk the myth that modernity was 
simply obsessed with unity, and rather exemplifies tendencies which have tradition­
ally been associated with post-modernity. Moreover, . . .  the exemplars of the post­
modem, particularly Derrida and Lacan, themselves exhibit certain pathologies of 
modernity. Reason is portrayed as displaced from its propriety" ("The Crisis of 
Reason in Modem Philosophy: The Pathological Case of Kant and Freud," Diss. 
SUNY at Stony Brook 1 \ 99 1 ], xxix). Otherwise, "postmodern" art would conform to 
the same structure as 'fine" art and kitsch, as a movement against modernity. 
That which is called "kitsch" is also regularly taken to be: 
(a) false ("fake," "inauthentic," "non-authentic," "illusory," "substitute," "spuri­
ous," "mystified," "counterfeit," "hypocritical," "imitation," "ersatz," "ahistorical," 
"seeming," "synthetic," "vicarious," and "deceptive") 
(h) of low quality ("cheap," "mediocre," "inferior," "vulgar," "degraded," "level­
ling," "trashy," and "insipid") 
(c) dependent upon 'simple' or 'low' emotions ("sugary," "pretty," "sentimental," 
"cute," "naIve," "sensational," "obscene," "saccharine," "comforting," "chaste," 
and "romantic") 
(d) focused on the inessential or trivial ("frivolous," "superficial," and "decora­
tive") 
(e) strongly connected to mass production, systemati7.ation, and marketing ("com­
mercial," "packagcd," "standardized," "cliched," and "formulaic") 
(f) dependent upon laziness or fatigue ("facile," "immediate," "bigoted," "unre­
nective," "uncultivated," "philistine," "predigested," and "unimaginative") 
(g) calculated for 'mass' appeal ("conformist" and "popular") 
and, finally, (h) ethically or morally wrong ("depraved," "fetisehistic," "danger­
ous," "evil," and "virulent") 
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WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH MATTER? 
PROBLEMS IN THE CRITICISM OF GREENBERG, 
FRIED, AND KRAuss 
Fonnalist critic Clement Greenberg has been, and in many ways continues to be, 
the foremost architect of our vision of Modernism-a vision extended, and to 
varying degrees modified, by two initial followers: Michael Fried and Rosalind 
Krauss. Though Greenberg has come under increasing attack since the Seventies, 
his "significance," as Donald Kuspit tells us, "cannot be overestimated. lie is the 
designer and subtle manipulator of modernism, which is the single most important 
and influential theory of modern art."l Similarly, when Leo Steinberg embarks in 
Other Criteria on an analysis of American fonnalism, it is to Greenberg, and 
Greenberg alone, that he turns-largely crediting the approach's "strength," "enor­
mous influence," and "theoretical justification" to Greenberg.2 Consequently, 
KUl;pit's conclusion seems justified: that even Greenberg's "detractors" partici­
pate "in what. . .psychoanalysts call the killing of the father-the father," in this 
case, "of modern American art criticism," since "they are all, in the last analysis, 
his sons."3 
Such hegemony makes crucial a precise understanding of what motivates 
Greenberg's criticism. This requires more than merely acknowledging, as is often 
done, his allegiance to basic principles of Western metaphysics,4 since doing so 
still falls short of our appreciating its full impact on the present vision of Modern­
ism. This essay, then, will explore more deeply the often taken-for-granted aspect 
of Greenberg's criticism-namely, the extent to which his approach is tied to basic, 
idealist tenets of Western metaphysics: the privileging of form over matter� a con­
cern with transcendence� a stress on abstraction, purity and essence, as well as on 
intelligibility, clear definitions, and distinctions. Matter, in this tradition, is the 
stuff of this world� form belongs to a higher, abstract realm that transcends worldly 
materiality. Greenberg's own commitment to this tradition, though, is at times 
obscured by his early advocacy of medi�xemplified by his championing of 
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